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Abstract: Objectives: This paper examines an omnibus ground of appellate jurisdiction of the 
Customary Court of Appeal in Nigeria to demonstrate that this ground of jurisdiction which refers to 
‘questions of customary law’ and the manner of interpretation by Nigerian courts has stifled the 
growth of customary law. Prior Work This work extends previous works on the nature of legal 
pluralism in Nigeria and how Nigerian courts interpret and develop this area of the law. Approach: 
Available literature as well as primary documents was used to the objectives of the study. 
Implications: This work is of value to academics and judges interested in the growth and 
development of customary law in particular and legal pluralism in Nigeria in general. Value: This 
paper suggests that a general omnibus jurisdictional clause should be expansively interpreted by 
Nigerian courts to recognise all issues concerning customary law as proper for appellate courts 
because this will tremendously assist the growth and development of customary law in Nigeria. 
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1. Introduction 
This article reviews the appellate jurisdiction of customary courts of appeal in 
Nigeria- which along with the Sharia Court of Appeal in Northern Nigeria- express 
Nigeria’s accommodation of her plural legal heritage and demonstrates that the 
judicial interpretation of the appellate jurisdiction of customary courts of appeal 
based on the interpretation of the requirement that appeals to customary courts of 
appeal and from customary courts of appeal to the Court of Appeal must be of 
“civil questions involving customary law”.  
Every plural legal order is faced with a choice between uniformity or diversity in 
the development of that order. Where unification is the objective, it is often 
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organized through a uniform judicial structure which is assumed result in a blended 
national law. A further challenge that confronts a plural legal order is how to craft 
the appellate process of its different orders. While it is normal that appellate 
jurisdiction in many common law countries such as Nigeria is based on a 
distinction between appeals on questions of law being as of right and appeals on 
facts being at the leave of the court, the nature of the different legal orders demand 
different considerations. The challenges of a uniform judicial structure as well as 
the distinction between “law” and “fact” have been of considerable influence in the 
manner in which Nigerian appellate courts have interpreted the requirement of 
“civil questions involving customary law”.  
This article addresses two issues emanating from an interpretation of this 
requirement. The first issue is that a challenge exists that the interpretation of the 
jurisdictional requirement will turn on a distinction between procedural and 
substantive issues following the “law” and “fact” divide. This distinction ignores 
fundamental realities that ascertainment and proof are key ingredients of an 
oracular system of law such as Nigerian customary law. Procedural and substantive 
issues are intimately connected in the existence and authenticity of a rule of 
customary law and as such a distinction would shut out many appellants and 
thereby stultify the development of customary law. The second challenge arises 
from the fact customary law is subject to a number of validity tests including issues 
of general law which must be satisfactory before a rule customary law can be 
applied. Accordingly in the interpretation of civil questions of customary law, care 
must be taken to avoid a distinction between issues of customary law and issues of 
general law. A simple response to the challenges of the appellate jurisdiction of a 
plural legal order would be to treat appeals of each legal order as the same 
especially where there is a uniform judicial structure. Nigeria choice in 
differentiating the appellate process for customary law from the general law has led 
to unintended consequences that are unsatisfactory and is symptomatic of a legal 
system still unsure of how to deal its legal plurality.  
The appellate jurisdiction over customary law issues in Nigeria articulated around 
customary courts of appeal within a unified common law system. At the bottom of 
a customary court judicial structure is a customary court from where appeals lie to 
customary courts of appeal. Appeals from customary courts of appeal go to 
common law courts first to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Nigerian 
Supreme Court. The Customary Court of Appeal is a creation of the 1979 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a concrete way of dealing with 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                      Vol. 11, no. 1/2015 
 
 40 
the existence of customary law in Nigeria (Okany 1984). Whilst customary courts 
in Nigeria’s plural judicial structure for the application of customary law is further 
defined by the part of Nigeria where customary law is sought to be applied. In the 
Northern part of the country consisting of 19 States, 13 of these States (Sokoto, 
Zamfara, Kebbi, Katsina, Kaduna, Gombe, Bauchi, Kano, Borno, Niger, Yobe 
Adamawa and Jigawa ) have not recognized customary law because of their 
adoption of Islam as the basis of their State legal system in both private and public 
law. The other 6 Northern States (Plateau, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Taraba and Keffi 
States) allow the operation of Islamic personal Law and Customary Law. The 
eighteen Southern States recognize and apply Customary Law in their territories. It 
is still an open point whether by the tenor of the 1999 Constitution customary law 
can still exist in the 13 Northern States where Islam is the basis of the legal system. 
(Oba 2002, p. 817).  
This article is divided as follows. In the next part the jurisdiction of customary 
courts of appeal is examined through an analysis of the requirement of ‘questions 
involving customary law’. The next part of the article examines the jurisdiction of 
the Customary Court of Appeal through a consideration of the interpretation by 
Nigerian courts of the requirement of ‘questions involving customary law’. A 
unique aspect of this jurisdiction which are appeals from customary courts to the 
customary courts of appeal is highlighted as a means of demonstrating how the 
jurisdictional requirement of questions of customary law has challenged the growth 
of customary law. Concluding remarks follow in the third part.  
 
2. The Jurisdiction of the Customary Court of Appeal  
Section 280 of the 1999 Constitution provides that any of Nigeria’s thirty-six states 
can establish a Customary Court of Appeal if it so wishes except for Nigeria’s 
Federal Capital where the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal is 
mandatory. It is therefore likely that it is the states that have established customary 
courts that are likely to opt to establish a Customary Court of Appeal. While many 
of the Southern States have established Customary Courts of Appeals, the 6 
Northern States that have not adopted Islamic law as the basis of their legal system 
such as Plateau State
1
 Benue State
1
 have also established Customary Courts of 
Appeal.  
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The jurisdiction of a Customary Court of Appeal can be gleaned from a combined 
reading of s. 245 and s 282 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. Section 245 provides that: “An appeal shall lie from decisions of a 
Customary Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right in any civil 
proceedings before the Customary Court of Appeal with respect to any question of 
customary law and such other matters as may be prescribed by an Act of the 
National Assembly”. 
Section 282 of the 1999 Constitution provides that: (1) A Customary Court of 
Appeal of a State shall exercise appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil 
proceedings involving questions of customary law. (2) For the purpose of this 
section, a Customary Court of Appeal of a State shall exercise and decide such 
questions as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State for which it 
is established.  
It can therefore be stated that the jurisdiction of a Customary Court of Appeal is 
constitutionally provided for but may be enlarged by the National Assembly with 
respect to appeals to the Court of Appeal and by the State Houses of Assembly 
with respect to appeals to the Customary Court of Appeal by customary courts. It is 
true that the Customary Court of appeal is an appellate court whilst her decisions 
are subject to appeals to the Court of Appeal. In both cases the constitutional 
endowment of jurisdiction of a Customary Court of Appeal is governed by the 
phrase “Questions of Customary Law” and it is to that phrase this article turns to. 
The importance of jurisdiction in Nigerian law is illustrated by the fact that it can 
be raised before original and appellate courts where it can be fatal to a suit.
2
 
 
2.1. Questions Involving Customary Law  
As the normative framework of communities in Nigeria consisting of communal 
norms which members of a community feel obligated to
3
 the interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 See the Benue State Customary Court of Appeal Edict 1999. 
2 See Ayman Enterprises Ltd v Akuma Industries Ltd (2003) 13 NWLR Pt 836, 22). 
3 In Oyewumi v Ogunsesan, (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt 137) 182, 207, Obaseki J.S.C. defined customary law 
as “The organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria regulating their lives and 
transactions. It is organic in that it is not static. It is regulatory in that it controls the lives and 
transaction of the community subject to it. It is said that custom is a mirror of the culture of the 
people. I would say that customary law goes further and imports justice to the lives of all those 
subject to it.” In Khairie Zaidan v Fatmah Khalil Mohssen (1973) 11 SC 1 Elias CJN described 
customary law as ‘ …any system of law not being t common law and not being a law enacted by any 
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phrase “civil questions involving questions of customary law” should ordinarily be 
a simple exercise and not a matter of considerable controversy. As a complete 
system customary law should ordinarily encompass all issues concerning 
customary law be they substantive or procedural. In its daily application in the lives 
of citizens who are subject to its jurisdiction, it would appear that the nature and 
extent of an alleged rule of customary law would be a matter of contention. Where 
however organs of state law mediate the application of customary law the issue is 
of significant importance for three reasons. The first is that customary law is oral 
and requires proof. Accordingly any assertion that an alleged rule is a customary 
rule requires a determination by a court as to the truth of such assertion. To 
posteriorly determine a question of customary law appears to put the horse before 
the cart. It is when evidence is laid in this regard that a court would be able to 
determine whether an alleged rule of customary law is indeed true. It is important 
to remember that section 14(1) of the Evidence Act
1
 provides that it can be proved 
by evidence unless it can be judicially noticed. Section 14(2) of the Evidence Act 
provides that custom may be judicially noticed if it has been acted upon by a court 
of superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction to an extent which justifies the court asked to 
apply it to assume that the persons or class of persons concerned in that area look 
upon same as binding.
 
Section 59 of the Evidence Act provides that customary law 
can be proved by opinions of persons having special knowledge of native law and 
custom (Park, 1963, at p. 87);
2
 opinions of native chiefs;
3
 any book;
4
 and any 
manuscript.
5
 Even though it was thought for long that many cases were required to 
enable a court take judicial notice of a custom
6
, it is now the law that one decision 
of a superior court of record is enough for the courts.
7
 Being questions of fact the 
existence of a rule of customary law is entirely at the discretion of the trial court 
since it is at liberty to believe or disbelieve the evidence.  
Thus whether a purported rule is a rule of customary law can be contested in a 
customary court. Accordingly parties can disagree on the number of witnesses and 
                                                                                                                                                   
competent legislature in Nigeria but is enforceable and binding within Nigeria as between the parties 
subject to its sway.’ 
1 Cap E14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
2 See Oyewunmi v Ogunsesan (1990) 5 SCNJ 33; Cole v Folami (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt 133) 445; 
Nzekwu v Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 104) 373. . 
3 See Ojemen v Momodu (2001) FWLR (Pt 37) 1138. 
4 See the cases of Amoo v Adigun [1957] WRNLR 55; Adedibu v Adewoyin (1951) 13 WACA 411  
5 See Adeseye v Taiwo (1956) 1 FSC 84.  
6 See the case of Olagbemiro v Ajagunbade III (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 37. 
7 See Oyewunmi v Ogunesan, note 2 .  
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other pieces of evidence that are called to establish a customary law rule. If a 
customary court wrongly evaluates the available evidence and decides that a 
customary law rule exists surely it should be the right for an aggrieved party to 
appeal to the Customary Court of Appeal on the ground that the evaluation of the 
facts that enabled a court to arrive at its decision is against the weight of evidence 
which is a matter of law. Unfortunately the interpretation of what is a question of 
customary law appears to have been heavily influenced by the common law 
distinction of facts and law which features prominently in constitutional and 
statutory provisions governing whether appeals should be of right or on the leave 
of court. This distinction between “facts” and “law” has had a deleterious effect on 
the interpretation of what a question of customary law is. 
Secondly customary law is subordinated to the Nigerian common law and 
legislation. Thus the validity of a customary law rule is predicated on compliance 
with three tests. The first test is that customary law must not be repugnant to 
natural justice equity and good conscience.
1
 This test has largely been mediated 
through the instrumentality as and standards of the common law. (Uchegbu, 2004, 
p. 75, Obilade, 1979, p. 110; Agbede, 1995, p. 407; Achimu, 1976, p. 35; Aboki, 
1991-1992, p. 1, Nwabueze 2002, 153).
 
In addition any customary law rule is 
subject to any written law
2
 and to a test of public policy as provided for in section 
14(3) of the Evidence Act. These tests are matters of evaluation contention and 
disagreement within any judicial structure including appellate points. Every alleged 
customary law rule is potentially open to such an evaluation. To seek to determine 
a question of customary law would appear to be meaningless since at all times the 
authenticity of any alleged rule of customary law is in issue and nothing is added 
by the test of a ‘question of customary law. 
Thirdly customary law applies within the context of a constitutional order that 
affirms the supremacy of the 1999 constitution
3
 and the invalidity of all laws 
                                                          
1 See for example section 45 of the Customary Court of Appeal Law of Bayelsa State , Cap. C16, 
Laws of Bayelsa State 2006 provides thus: (1) the Customary Court of Appeal in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution and the Law as regards both substantive law, and practice 
and procedure shall administer, observe and enforce the observance of the principles and provisions 
every customary law which is applicable and is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience nor incompatible either directly or by implication with any written law for the time being 
in force , and nothing in this Law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any such law’ 
2 See for example section 34(1), High Court Law, Cap 67 Laws of Kwara State 1994. See the 
following cases Rotibi v Savage (1944) 17 NLR 17 and Adesubokan v Yinusa (1971) NNLR 77. 
3 Section 1 (1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the Constitution is supreme and its provisions 
shall have binding force on al authorities and persons throughout the Federal republic of Nigeria 
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contrary to its provisions
1
 including a liberal Bill of Rights contained in chapter 
four of the 1999 of the 1999 Constitution. Every assertion of a customary law rule 
potentially implicates the 1999 Constitution and requires an evaluation whether the 
rule breaches the Bill of Rights given the fact that most customary rules given their 
communal orientation appear potentially contradictory to an individually oriented 
Bill of Rights. Nigerian courts have struck down a number of customary law rules 
for breaching a number of human rights including the right to freedom of 
association;
2
 and the right to freedom from discrimination.
3
 It is therefore 
important to contemplate all appeals concerning customary law in order to assess 
whether the rule will pass constitutional muster. To dwell on what constitutes 
“questions of customary law” misses the essence of the interaction of legal orders 
especially when state law mediates the reproduction and authenticity of another 
legal order.  
These considerations have regrettably not been within the consideration of 
Nigerian courts as they grapple to determine what a question of customary law is 
within appellate court law and practice. It would appear that appellate courts are 
intuitively restrictive in their jurisdictional remit and thus actively seek to constrain 
the matters that come before them. Nigerian appellate courts are no different. 
Combined with an inadequate articulation of the nature of the Nigerian customary 
law, the issue of what a question of customary law is has led to starling 
interpretations by Nigerian appellate courts. Three streams of interpretation can be 
identified. The first line of interpretation is based on the decision of the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in Golok v Diyalpwan
4 
where Court considered the meaning of 
‘questions of customary law’. In that case the plaintiff/respondent brought an 
action in the Area Court in Plateau State, claiming recovery of a piece of farmland 
from defendant/appellant who he alleged borrowed against the security of the land. 
His appeal against a judgment given against him to the Plateau State Customary 
Court of Appeal was allowed and the decision of the Area Court was set aside. The 
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal grounds of appeal including one omnibus 
ground that alleged that the judgment is against the weight of evidence. The 
                                                          
1 Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that ‘ if any other law inconsistent with the 
provisions of this constitution, the constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of 
such inconsistency be void.’ 
2 See Agbai v Okagbue (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt 204) 391. 
3 See Muojekwu v Muojekwu [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 283; Okonkwo v Okagbue [1994] 9 NWLR 
(Pt. 368) 301. 
4 (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 411. 
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Supreme Court held that omnibus ground which dealt purely with facts is not a 
question of customary law.  
It appears however that it is the cast of a ground of appeal is that often influences a 
court in its interpretation of what a question of customary law is. A hint of this 
interpretative inclination in Golok was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Hirnor 
v Yongo
1
 where Uwaifo JSC points out that the decision in Golok …“provides 
some considerable leeway for an insightful counsel to skillfully draw up competent 
grounds of appeal to meet appropriate grievances within the limitation”
2
 of the 
relevant constitutional provision. That insight is to omit an omnibus ground of 
appeal. Consistent with Golok the means of determining a question of customary 
law lies in the manner in which the grounds of appeal are couched and not the 
subject matter of the appealed decision of a customary court. On this point the 
Court of Appeal in Aguele held that it is not the subject matter of the action in the 
trial court that confers jurisdiction on the Customary Court of Appeal but rather the 
ground of appeal from the decision of the Area or Customary Court.
3
  
In Iyamu v Aigbiremwen
4
 the Court of Appeal was faced with a situation where 
grounds of appeal filed before it from a decision of a Customary Court of Appeal 
were sought to be amended. Ground one of the original grounds of appeal reads as 
follows: “The learned President of the Customary Court of Appeal erred in law in 
allowing against the decision of the trial customary court when the facts found by 
the trial court were not challenged on appeal.” The amended ground one read thus: 
The Learned President of the Customary Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing 
the appeal against the decision of the trial customary law when the facts found by 
the trial court which were based on the appropriate customary law
5
 were not 
challenged on appeal. The Court relying on the fact that the original grounds of 
appeal did not raise any issue of customary law held that there was nothing to 
amend. It is questionable whether this is correct. As the amended grounds of appeal 
reveal it is the addition of words to the effect that customary law is implicated that 
may be pivotal in determining what a question of customary law is. 
Even at that, it is difficult from the cases to determine a consistent interpretation of 
what amounts to ‘questions of law’ when the basis of such a determination is based 
                                                          
1 [2003] 9 NWLR (pt. 824) 77. 
2 [2003] 9 NWLR (pt. 824) 77,102. 
3 [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt 995) 545,565. 
4 [1992] 2 NWLR (pt. 222) 233. 
5 The italicized words are the addition to the ground of appeal. 
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on the cast of the ground of appeal. For example in Ononiwu v Ukaegbu
1
the Court 
of Appeal relying on Golok evaluated grounds of appeal in that case and held that 
ground one (1) of the appeal which alleged that the Court erred when the 
Customary Court of Appeal held that a pledge had been proved at customary law 
was a question of law while ground two (2) which alleged that a customary pledge 
had been proved despite the defendants contradiction introduced by traditional 
history was a matter of evaluation of evidence and therefore a question of fact 
which is not a question of customary law. In Pam v Gwom
2
 the Supreme Court 
defined “questions of customary law” in terms of dispute as to the extent and 
manner of which such applicable customary law determines and regulates the right, 
obligation or relationship of the parties having regard to the facts established in the 
case. The Court stated however that where the decision of the Customary Court of 
Appeal turns on facts or on question of procedure such decision is not with respect 
a question customary law, notwhistanding that the applicable law is customary law. 
Even though the Supreme Court did not regard appeals on facts as ‘questions of 
law’ the evaluation of grounds of appeal in Pam point to the contrary. In Pam six 
grounds of appeal were filed. Ground three which was disallowed and ground four 
which was allowed are important for our analysis. Ground three alleged that “The 
learned Justices of the Customary Court of Appeal, Jos erred in law when it (sic) 
assumed that the land in dispute was either given out as loan or gift and thus 
required the presence of witnesses.” As the particulars of misdirection, it was 
alleged that “The decision of the Court was solely based on the presumption that it 
is a general custom that is applicable in Nigeria based on the authority of Cole v 
Falami .when no such evidence was led at the trial.” Ground four which was 
allowed stated that: “  
The Learned Justices of the Customary Court of Appeal erred in Law when it (sic) 
held that under Berom Native Law and Custom one cannot bury his dead on 
another man’s (sic) land.” Ground three which is designated a question of fact is 
really a question of law because what the ground really alleges is that the 
Customary Court of Appeal misconstrued the Berom natïve law and custom on 
what constitutes a loan and gift and that it requires the presence of witnesses for a 
valid transaction. This ground is not different from ground four which alleged a 
wrong interpretation of Berom Native law and Custom. This highlights the point 
                                                          
1 [2001] 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 530. See also the case of Okoro v Nwachukwu [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 
1024) 69.   
2 (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) 322. 
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being made that all purported questions of fact about native law and custom 
invariable involve customary law because it is either about the existence of a rule 
of customary law or the extent of its application. 
The second stream of interpretation revolves around assertions that a rule of 
customary law is in breach of a statute or even the 1999 Constitution and is not 
therefore a question of customary law. A good example is the Land Use Act which 
recognizes customary rights of occupancy and which endows jurisdiction over this 
right of occupancy on customary courts. In Okhae v Governor Bendel State
1
, 
Salami JSC seriously doubted the possibility of a Customary Court of Appeal 
dealing with land matters because such appeals would involve the Land Use Act. It 
is to be noted that the jurisdiction of a customary court over land is further defined 
by the Land Use Act
2
 as interpreted by the Courts. Section 41 of the Land Use Act 
vests on the customary court jurisdiction in respect of proceedings over customary 
right of occupancy
3
 granted by a local government. Accordingly any ground of 
appeal based on the extent of the jurisdiction of a customary court over customary 
courts of occupancy would without question involve a question of customary law. 
Other legislation have been a basis of determining the absence of “questions 
involving customary law”. Thus in Okhai v Akpoemonye
4
 it was held that since a 
Customary Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to interpret statutes such an exercise 
has nothing to do with questions of customary law. As stated above the 1999 
Constitution is not left out. Thus in Customary Court of Appeal v Aguele
5
 the 
contention that the observance of the right to fair hearing as provided for in section 
36(1) of the 1999 Constitution by operation of law forms part of the proceedings of 
Area/Customary Court of a State and therefore raised a question of customary law 
was not upheld and the Court of Appeal held that grounds of appeal that alleged 
breach of the right to fair hearing and the service of processes on the respondent 
before the trial court were not “questions of customary law”. With due respect 
questions of fair hearing are intricately linked to and are part of customary law. 
Fair hearing is a fundamental principle that all judicial structures charged with the 
application of customary law must comply with it in accordance with section 36 of 
the 1999 Constitution. It should therefore be open to a litigant to allege that the 
                                                          
1 [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 327. Hereafter Okhae. 
2 Cap L5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
3 A customary right of occupancy is defined in section 51 of the Land Use Act as the right of a person 
or community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with customary law and includes a 
customary right of occupancy granted by a local government.   
4 (1999) 1 SCNJ 73. See also Mashuwareng v Abdu [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 831) 403.  
5 [2006] 12 NWLR (pt. 995) 545. Hereafter Aguele. 
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principle has not been complied with. It cannot be the case that such an allegation 
will succeed. All that is required is for the appellate court to examine the 
complaint.  
The third stream of interpretation arises out of unease with the distinction in Golok 
and subsequent cases. For example in Aguele, the Court of Appeal lamented the 
sad state of the jurisdiction of the Customary Court of Appeal and pointed out that 
questions of fair hearing and service of a process are questions of customary law. It 
was not surprising therefore when the Court of Appeal in Anyabine v Okolo
1
 the 
Court of Appeal expressed a different opinion on the means of determining 
whether an appeal concerns questions of customary law. The Court held that in 
ascertaining questions raised in appeal from a Customary Court of Appeal to a 
Court of Appeal, a liberal approach must be taken so as to ensure that the issues in 
controversy in the appeal are adequately ascertained. To that end the Court held 
that the grounds of appeal would not prima facie be the only document to be relied 
upon. The Court continued that it is necessary to go through the entire record of 
proceedings, the issues in controversy between the parties at the trial and the 
controversy sought to be resolved on appeal so as to ascertain the real issues in 
dispute. The Court specifically held that section 247(1) of the 1979 Constitution 
does not stipulate whether or not grounds of appeal should be restricted to grounds 
involving law alone. With respect to the grounds of appeal in this case the Court of 
Appeal held that what was being complained about was the procedure adopted by 
the trial customary court and that this was connected to questions of customary 
law. This is a better articulation of the meaning of “questions of customary law”. It 
cannot be correct that the procedure of courts designed to apply customary law 
should not contemplated as part of customary law when the procedure in that court 
is designed to establish facts which establish customary law. A further ray of hope 
can be found in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Nwaigwe v Okere
2
 
where the Supreme Court held that since the concept of jurisdiction is of universal 
application and known to customary law when applied to a customary court, an 
error of jurisdiction by a customary court or a Customary Court of Appeal which is 
a defect intrinsic to adjudication, is an issue of customary law. The Court further 
held that the contrary would kill the development of the jurisdiction of a 
Customary Court of Appeal. 
 
                                                          
1 [1998] 13 NWLR (pt. 582) 444. 
2 2008 13 NWLR (Pt 1105) 445. 
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2.2. “Civil Questions of Customary Law” and the Appellate Jurisdiction of 
Customary Courts of Appeal 
It is important to draw attention to the significance of the interpretation of the 
“question of customary law” to the appellate jurisdiction of customary courts of 
Appeal. Since only customary courts can appeal to customary courts of appeal the 
significance of the interpretation of “civil questions of customary law” would have 
been of no moment if customary courts of appeal are endowed with exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from customary courts. The fact that state high courts are 
of coordinate jurisdiction with customary courts of appeal inevitably leads to a 
delineation of the respective jurisdiction of the two courts. It is not therefore 
surprising that in Usman v Umaru
1
 the Supreme Court set out the respective 
jurisdictions of the State High Courts and the Customary Courts of Appeal as 
follows: “The unlimited jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on the High 
Court is curtailed by section 242, and 247 conferring jurisdictions on the other two 
courts in respect of their areas of specialty. The Area Court possesses jurisdiction 
to administer customary law (including Islamic Law) generally. It is from this 
court that appeals go to any of the three superior courts, that is, High Court, 
Sharia Court of Appeal and Customary Court of Appeal. In my humble view, the 
superior court to which the appeal goes would be determined by the nature of the 
questions raised by the appeal. If the appeal raises issues of general law, it goes to 
the High Court. But if it raises questions of Islamic personal law, it goes to the 
Sharia Court of Appeal. And it if raises questions involving customary law, the 
appeal goes to the Customary Court, of Appeal… I can hardly, however visualize a 
case where any two of these three courts will have concurrent jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal.” 2 
Many observers have commented on the difficulty inherent in such judicial forum 
shopping where litigants are forced to formulate grounds of appeal focused on 
particular courts.
3
 It is easy to imagine how a litigant would first ensure that a 
ground of appeal does not deal with facts and also deal with determining what a 
question of customary law means. To understand the difficulties involved in this 
                                                          
1 (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt 254) 377. 
2 (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt 254) 377, 397. 
3 See for example J.O Olubor ‘Customary Court of Appeal in Nigeria: Focus on Jurisdiction’ 
Available at 
www.nigerianlawguru.com/article/CUSTOMARY%20LAW%20AND20COURT%20OF%20APPEA
L%20IN%20NIGERIA%20-FOCUS%20ON%20THE%20JURISDICTION.pdf (Accessed 4-11- 
2014).  
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process it is important to examine the jurisdiction of customary courts which would 
have a bearing on the route of an appeal. 
The civil jurisdiction of a typical customary court is certainly wide. For example 
section 6 of the Customary Court Law of Bayelsa State provides that the 
Customary Court shall have jurisdiction over matters to the extent set out in the 
First Schedule to the Law. This schedule sets out the unlimited civil jurisdiction to 
include land causes and land matters meaning causes and matters relating to the 
ownership occupation or possession of land; matrimonial causes in respect of 
marriages under customary law; debt demand or damages claimed between persons 
married under customary law, or arising from marriage under customary law; 
custody of children and other causes and matters relating to children under 
customary law. The limited causes have a monetary ceiling in respect of causes and 
matters relating to inheritance upon intestacy under customary law; grant of power 
or authority to any person to administer the estate of an intestate under customary 
law and civil actions in contracts and torts at common law and at customary law. It 
is difficult to neatly delineate grounds of appeal relating to customary law and 
those pertaining to a general law from a decision of a customary court.  
Many customary courts are endowed with criminal jurisdiction. For example 
section 11 of the Bayelsa State Customary Courts Law, provides that where there is 
a contravention of a customary law, a Customary Court may impose a penalty 
authorized by or consistent with the Customary law but no such penalty shall 
involve cruelty mutilation torture or other personal violence or shall be inhuman 
degrading or repugnant to natural justice and humanity. The imposition of a 
penalty clearly locates this jurisdiction as a criminal jurisdiction. It is important to 
remember the constitutional injunction in section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution 
that no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is 
defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law made by either the 
National Assembly or the State House of Assembly.
1
 While it would appear 
doubtful that section 11 of the Bayelsa State Customary Court Law is 
constitutionally compliant, it may be necessary to assume that it is
2
 to enable an 
                                                          
1 See the celebrated case of Aoko v Fagbemi (1961) All NLR 400.  
2 Aplausible basis of criminal jurisdiction of a customary court is the provisions of section 10(1)d of 
the Bayelsa State Customary Court Law which provides that the rules and by-laws made by a local 
government councils in Bayelsa State shall be enforced by a customary court. It is important to 
remember that section 7(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) delimits the powers of a Local 
Government Council by stating that these functions should include the matters included in the Fourth 
Schedule to the Constitution. The nature of these functions endow regulatory powers on local 
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understanding of how the endowment of a criminal jurisdiction on a customary 
court is affected by the requirement of ‘civil questions involving customary law’. 
To assist in this regard it is important to draw attention to the interpretation of the 
conferment of criminal jurisdiction on the then Bendel State Customary Court of 
Appeal by the Customary Court Edict of Bendel State 1984 and the Customary 
Court of Appeal Edict also of 1984. These two legislations were struck down as 
unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal in Okhae v Governor Bendel State.
1
 The 
emphatic manner in which the Court of Appeal held that customary or Sharia 
Courts of Appeal have no jurisdiction over criminal matters means that at present 
Customary or Sharia Courts of Appeal can only exercise jurisdiction in civil 
matters. The inability of the Customary Court of Appeal to hear criminal matters 
means that for those criminal matters for which a customary court has jurisdiction, 
it is to the High Courts that appeals will lie.
 
Thus out of one matter before a 
customary court, certain grounds of appeal are tenable before the state high court 
while other grounds of appeal are valid before the Customary Court of Appeal.  
Yet another example is a controversy which lasted for long whether State High 
Courts exercise a concurrent jurisdiction over customary rights of occupancy with 
customary courts. In Adisa v Oyinwola
2
 the Supreme Court overruled the decisions 
in Salati v Shehu
3
 and Oyeniran v Egbetola
4
 that High Courts do not have 
concurrent jurisdiction over customary rights of occupancy. Thus in Osungwu v 
Onyeikigbo
5
 the Court of Appeal held that since a High Court has a concurrent 
jurisdiction over a customary right of occupancy it has jurisdiction to entertain a 
case for the determination of the appropriate court in respect of a customary right 
of occupancy. Accordingly the State High Court will entertain an appeal that does 
not indicate a question of customary law, while the Customary Court of Appeal 
will entertain grounds of appeal that pertain to questions involving questions of 
customary law.  
As stated above the national and state legislatures can enlarge the jurisdiction of a 
customary court of appeal. The question is whether such an enlargement must 
relate to “questions of customary law”. Some States of the Nigerian federation have 
                                                                                                                                                   
governments and It is often the case that these rules and by laws contain provisions which imposes 
penalties for acts and omissions amounting to criminal offences. See Mukoro 2011, p. 139. 
1 (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 327. 
2 [2000] FWLR (Pt. 8) 1349.See also Asemo v Ibrahim (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) 20. 
3 [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 198. 
4 [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 122.  
5 [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 950) 80.  
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expanded the jurisdiction of their Customary Court of Appeal in accordance with 
the provisions of section 280(2) of the 1999 Constitution. In Imo State for example 
section 55 (1) of the Imo State Customary Court of Appeal Edict No 7 of 1984 
endows the Imo State Customary Court of Appeal with jurisdiction over final 
decisions in any criminal or civil proceedings under customary law; where the 
ground of appeal to the Customary Court of Appeal involves questions of law 
alone, final decisions in any criminal proceedings in which any person has been 
sentenced to imprisonment and decisions on any civil or criminal proceedings 
under customary Law on questions as to interpretation of the Constitution.’ The 
import of these amendments were examined by the Supreme Court in Nwaigwe v 
Okere
1
 where the Supreme Court decided that section 55(1) did not introduce more 
than the jurisdiction conferred by the 1999 Constitution. However a close reading 
of section 55 indicates clearly that the jurisdiction of the Imo State Customary 
Court of Appeal was expanded and it would appear that a right of appeal as of right 
was granted in respect of criminal matters. At facial value it would appear that the 
Court is correct since it appears that the constitutional scheme restricts questions of 
customary law to civil matters especially within the context of the jurisdictional 
requirement of “civil questions involving customary law”. It is the constitutional 
restriction of the appellate jurisdiction of customary courts of appeal to civil 
matters that also sustains the coordinate jurisdiction of state high courts who decide 
criminal appeals from customary courts.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up this paper, it is clear that the interpretation of the jurisdictional 
requirement of “civil questions involving customary law” is problematic both in 
terms of the cast of this requirement and its interpretation by Nigerian courts. 
While there appears to be an awareness of the need to regard matters of law and 
fact as involving questions of customary law, there needs to be a constitutional 
amendment towards an exclusive jurisdiction of customary courts of appeal in 
terms of appeals from customary courts to enable such courts to consider all 
appeals from customary courts. This amendment should also remove the word 
“civil” from the jurisdictional requirement as it is unnecessary and confusing. 
Without such an amendment it is unlikely that the true potential of customary law 
will be realized in Nigeria. It is even more important that the jurisdictional 
                                                          
1 2008 13 NWLR (Pt 1105) 44. 
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requirement of “questions of customary law” is dispensed with to enable a 
customary court of appeal and other appellate courts to adjudicate all appeals about 
customary law. The nature and extent of customary law in its interaction with state 
law would become clearer. This clarity is important in the emergence of a Nigerian 
common law (Aguda, 1989, p. 249; Elias, 1969, p. 18; Tobi, 1996, pp. 186-187) 
and would ensure that appropriate respect and dignity is accorded customary law.   
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